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LOUIS BRANDEIS’S ARC OF MORAL JUSTICE 
Katherine A. Helm*  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, is 
an infamous figure in American jurisprudence.  “As in the case of 
many justices, Brandeis was first a practicing attorney; a professional 
that had to face the daily nuances of conflict that inhere in one’s legal 
practice.”1  Brandeis was a devoted American, who took his civic 
duties seriously and who chose to use his status in, and his 
knowledge of, the law in part to promote social change.  As such, he 
labored too with the overlay of occasionally having publicly 
promoted policy and governance not always symmetrical with his 
clients’ causes and the litigative stances he previously took on their 
behalf.  The trajectory of his life as a lawyer made him an uncommon 
force for change, but still a lawyer that corporate America wanted.  
As such Brandeis was a provocative figure indeed.  He was a man 
true to himself and, critically here, always an independent contractor 
– never bowing as a servant.2 
Accordingly, when it came to his confirmation by the United 
States Senate, after President Woodrow Wilson nominated Louis 
Brandeis to the U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis faced a considerable 
 
*Katherine A. Helm, J.D., Ph.D., is a senior litigation associate at Simpson Thacher & 
Bartlett LLP.  Her practice focuses on representing clients in complex patent litigation and 
related intellectual property, antitrust and international arbitration matters.  Dr. Helm has 
published over 50 articles, book chapters and commentary on a variety of legal issues, 
including as a legal columnist for Law.com. A longer version of this article, focusing on 
legal ethics, appeared in the Journal of the Legal Profession in Fall 2010.  
1 Katherine A. Helm, What Justice Brandeis Taught Us About Conflicts of Interests, 35 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 1 (2010). 
2 Inspiration for this article, and most of the historical accounting on Brandeis’s ethics, 
came from the following four sources: MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 
(Schocken eds., 1st ed. 2009); A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS (McGraw Hill eds. 1964); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 
17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965); and Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering 
Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996). 
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uproar from his opponents in the legislature.3  That opposition did not 
aim its attention at the socio-legal agenda that Brandeis might choose 
to advocate once on the Court - such as in the case, for example, of 
more recent nominees like Robert Bork - but aimed instead at the 
problematic ethical quandaries that might have confronted Brandeis 
during the course of his legal career, both in the clients and causes on 
whose behalf he sought to advocate. 4 
Some might argue that, at bottom, Brandeis was scrutinized 
so severely by the Senate Judiciary Committee not because the issues 
raised against him were meritorious, but rather because these issues 
were mere smokescreens fomented by the anti-Semitism of the day.5  
But whether or not a religious or social bias caused the strict scrutiny 
into Brandeis’s past which he faced, to use the language of today, the 
raw fact is that Brandeis’s conduct as an attorney, rightly or wrongly, 
did indeed occasionally raise nettlesome ethical questions deserving 
of analysis.6  
Setting aside whether the scrutiny of Brandeis was indeed 
politically motivated, to soften the perceived motives of his attackers 
and focus on the “lessons learned,” the issue addressed in this article 
is whether his legal conduct would be challengeable through the 
prism of today’s ethical mores, and with the benefit of hindsight and 
perspective over time, now on a more objective level.   
How do we, including those of us who do not aspire to a 
judicial appointment, learn from and modify our conduct as attorneys 
when faced with the conflicts that faced Brandeis?  Stated otherwise, 
on the major issues that faced him in the Senate concerning client 
conflicts of interest, did Brandeis behave ethically?  There were 
 
3 See UROFSKY, supra note 2, at 437-38. 
4 In the candid words of Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-Del.), member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, during a June 26, 2009 interview, “[t]he big difference was, after [Robert] Bork, 
the process became like the Super Bowl.”  Interview, The National Law Journal, Q&A With 
Sen. Ted Kaufman (June 29, 2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/qa-with-sen-
ted-kaufman.html.  Further, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stated that “[J]udicial appointments 
have become increasingly contentious.”  Senate Judiciary Hearing Transcript, The United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Judiciary (July 13, 2009), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-nomination-of-sonia-sotomayor-to-be-an-
associate-justiceof-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states. 
Brandeis’s confirmation hearings may represent the one exception to this otherwise 
generally true statement. 
5 HELM, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
6 HELM, supra note 1, at 4.  
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several attacks made about Brandeis’s legal ethics in practice during 
his confirmation hearings.  This article focuses on the one that 
consumed the most time and attention on the Senate floor, the issue 
of prior clients and successive or situational conflicts of interest.   
II.  ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO FORMER CLIENTS 
As any attorney with his or her own book of business knows, 
perhaps the most vexing part of law firm practice is the inevitable 
problem of client conflicts of interest.7  Whether a lawyer can take on 
a new client depends on what work that lawyer and other lawyers at 
his or her firm have done in the past.8  The prevailing wisdom is that 
a conflict of interest arises when a lawyer’s professional judgment is 
compromised, or appears to be compromised, due to contrary 
influences or diverging interests between clients.9  In the case law, 
conflicts often arise when there are competing financial interests 
between the counsel and the client that could affect the counsel’s 
duty of loyalty to his or her client.10   
Legal ethics rules governing conflicts of interest apply to 
individual clients and corporate clients alike and are very general, 
e.g., the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules 1.7 
(concurrent conflicts) and 1.9 (successive conflicts).11  These rules 
aim to provide workable guidelines to help lawyers establish a system 
for siphoning out clear conflicts and for recognizing when conflicts 
may be permitted after appropriate disclosure and approval.12  
Practitioners are often frustrated by the open-ended nature of these 
rules, however, which seem to lend themselves to academic study by 
law professors on conflicts and other matters of professional 
responsibility rather than to their actual practical application to assist 
 
7 HELM, supra note 1, at 10.  
8 HELM, supra note 1, at 10-11.  
9 HELM, supra note 1, at 11.  
10 See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (disqualifying a lawyer 
due to an interest in another client’s retainer, which created an actual conflict of interest and 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). A 
conflict could also arise when the lawyer has some form of ownership interest in the client 
being represented, e.g., recall when Brandeis was both counsel for and a director of the 
United Shoe Machinery Company, as discussed infra. 
11 HELM, supra note 1, at 11. 
12 HELM, supra note 1, at 11. 
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and benefit practicing lawyers and their clients.13  This article 
examines the tension between an important conflict rule’s intent and 
its practical implications, as exemplified in a controversy involving 
Justice Louis Brandeis.   
Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules deals with a lawyer’s 
professional obligations to former clients.14  It sets forth the legal 
standard under which any practicing attorney should operate.15  The 
Rule states that a lawyer “who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client” unless the 
former client consents.16  The italicized language highlights the three 
questions for disqualification:  Is there a former client; is the new 
matter substantially related; and are the former client’s interests 
materially adverse to the prospective client’s interests.17  All three of 
these questions must be answered in the negative before the lawyer 
can bring the new client in the door.18 
The “substantial relationship test” in Model Rule 1.9 also 
appears in Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9, the New York 
Code provision governing former client conflicts.  This test 
effectively serves as a proxy for court inspection.19  After one client 
relationship terminates, a lawyer has certain continuing fiduciary 
duties, with respect to confidentiality, loyalty, disclosure and acting 
in a client’s best interest, which is not rescindable on behalf of a new 
 
13 HELM, supra note 1, at 11.  In the words of Chief Justice Roberts: “[T]he law professors 
aren’t the ones who deal with this question on a day-to-day basis and have to worry about 
going to jail. . . .” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39:7-10, Mohawk Indus. Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (No. 08-678). 
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2009). 
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (emphasis added) 
(explaining that consent must be informed and confirmed in writing). 
17 The origin of the “substantial relationship” test is generally credited to Judge 
Weinfeld’s opinion in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (explaining the policy reasons why a substantial relationship test exists 
for former clients but not current clients). 
18 Id. at 269. 
19 The test was formulated so that the court need not make the inappropriate inquiry into 
whether actual confidences were disclosed.  Id. at 269 (“To compel the client to show, in 
addition to establishing that the subject of the present adverse representation is related to the 
former, the actual confidential matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible 
value to the present client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer-
client relationship.”).  Id.  
4
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client.20  At the same time, a lawyer has the duty to offer a 
prospective new client legal representation free of conflicts from the 
lawyer’s prior representation of clients having interests adverse to the 
prospective client.21  The substantial relationship test boils down to a 
question of whether the lawyer could have obtained confidential 
information in the first representation that would have been relevant 
in the second representation.22  It is of no moment whether the lawyer 
would or could use the information.23  If the answer is yes, the lawyer 
cannot sign on the second, successive client, unless the former 
affected client provides informed written consent.24   
The ABA now permits the presumption that confidences were 
revealed to be rebutted in some circumstances through the use of 
certain institutional mechanisms at law firms—like screens and 
ethical walls.25 This presumption is limited though, and generally 
only applies when a lawyer switches firms and an adversary of a 
client of that lawyer or his former firm then retains the new firm.26  
Nowadays, most large firms require their clients to sign 
waivers upon retention, which seek to avoid future conflicts by 
having the client waive certain of their rights in advance.27  Most 
 
20 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 1 (2016). 
21 Id.  
22 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2016). 
23 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 8 (2016). 
24 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
 A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information 
learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the 
lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter.  A 
conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on 
the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and 
information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer 
providing such services. 
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
26 The new firm can avoid disqualification by imputation, under MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.10, by showing that protective steps were taken to prevent confidences from 
being received by lawyers in the new firm handling the new matter.  N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016).  However, not all states permit the uses of screens, while other 
states recognize screening mechanisms only to avoid disqualification but not as an ethical 
matter.  See, e.g., Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 
(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that not every violation of a disciplinary rule requires 
disqualification because disqualification is only warranted where “an attorney’s conduct 
tends to taint the underlying trial,” while ethical violations can be left to federal and state 
disciplinary mechanisms) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 
1979)). 
27 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(c), cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see, 
e,g., Merri A. Baldwin, Risky Business: Identifying, Preventing, and Managing Conflicts of 
5
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clients are familiar with the process whereby once they express 
interest in retaining a law firm, they receive an engagement letter 
detailing some of the basic terms upon which the firm would be 
providing legal services.  While some clients or lawyers might prefer 
less formal methods of confirming the terms of the lawyer-client 
relationship, it is considered good ethical practice and is infinitely 
useful to have a letter that lays out the terms of engagement both to 
the lawyer and to the client prior to beginning work on the matter.28  
Moreover, the laws of many states now require engagement letters.29   
Typical language in a client engagement letter grants written 
permission for the law firm to be adverse to that client in all but the 
same or substantially the same area.30  Some waiver language may 
grant permission for the firm to represent future clients adverse to 
them in related areas, under certain conditions but excluding direct 
litigation against the current or former client.31  Other waiver 
language may grant permission for the firm to represent future clients 
in related areas only after the present client matter is completed.32  
The enforceability of some of the more extensive contractual 
provisions is often temporally limited and may be either expressly or 
inherently limited in the context of binding large corporate families.33  
Waivers are not wholesale panaceas, clearly, as the contractual 
language can vary from client to client and some clients may refuse 
to waive any rights in advance.34  Whether the law firm will retain the 
 
Interest, AM. BAR. ASSOC. (May 20, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/articles/spring2014-0514-
risky-business-identifying-preventing-managing-conflicts-of-interest.html.  
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see, e,g  
Marian C. Rice, Engagement Letters: Beginning a Beautiful Relationship, AM. BAR. ASSOC. 
(June 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2013/may-
june/ethics.html.  
29 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1215.1 (2002) (showing that in New 
York, engagement letters are required as an ethical matter). 
30 Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
31 Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
32 Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
33 For example, the court in Elonex I.P. Holdings, Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 142 F. 
Supp. 2d 579, 582-84 (D. Del. 2001) found that Apple was sufficiently informed about the 
conflict in granting a full waiver and not merely a transactional waiver, based on the extent 
and nature of high-level discussions the firm had with Apple’s in-house counsel.  Id.  See 
Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
34 See, e.g., Zusha Elinson, Wet Blankets: GCs Don’t Waiver, THE RECORDER (June 9, 
2008), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202422009415/Wet-Blankets-GCs-Dont-
Waiver?slreturn=20170020090012 (discussing the trend of Silicon Valley technology 
6
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client who has not agreed to the waiver provision depends on a host 
of factors that includes the amount of business the client brings to the 
firm and the history of the client’s relationship with the firm.35  
Moreover, tacit concerns exist about some of the more adhesive 
waivers and whether potential attempts to contract around ethical 
obligations are themselves unethical.36   
It is hardly surprising that even the best of lawyers can find 
themselves muddling these ethical obligations when trying to be a 
good rainmaker and get new clients in the door.  None of us is 
immune from the temptation to just fix the problem later, i.e., to ask 
for forgiveness instead of seeking permission beforehand.  With 
former client conflicts in particular, the temptation to gloss over ties 
to past relationships to present oneself as being available for future 
opportunities can be hard to resist. 
III.  BRANDEIS’S 1916 CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
The issue of former client conflicts arose in Louis D. 
Brandeis’s Senate hearings on his nomination to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1916.37  Prior to his appointment by President Woodrow 
Wilson, Brandeis had been the head of a New England law 
partnership with his law school classmate Samuel Warren for almost 
forty years.38  Brandeis successfully positioned himself as an expert 
legal strategist on commercial matters during the Second Industrial 
Revolution and clients relied on him for sage business advice along 
with legal counsel during the “great merger wave” that created mega-
corporations in many industries at the time including steel and 
tobacco.39  By all accounts, Brandeis’s legacy as a visionary legal 
mind rests not only on his celebrated judicial works but also his 
 
companies to balk at engagement letters by outside counsel requesting up-front, blanket 
unconditional waivers of future conflicts of interest).  See also Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
35 Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
36 Helm, supra note 1, at 14. 
37 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2004); 
Helm, supra note 1, at 5. 
38 Nutter, Nutter Recognizes the 100th Anniversary of Founding Partner Louis Brandeis’s 
Nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, NUTTER (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.nutter.com/Nutter-Recognizes-the-100th-Anniversary-of-Founding-Partner-
Louis-Brandeiss-Nomination-to-the-US-Supreme-Court-01-28-2016/; Helm, supra note 1, at 
5. 
39 See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA 1865-1900 
22-24 (Vintage eds. 2008). 
7
Helm: Arc of Moral Justice
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
150 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
common biographical depiction as having been “the people’s 
attorney” in both his corporate law and litigation practice.40  Perhaps 
because of the inescapable interweaving of public and private issues 
that occurred as Brandeis advanced both social policy and client 
positions in a public forum throughout his career, the lawyer faced 
fierce accusations in his confirmation hearings that he had violated 
legal ethics in his law practice.41  Of all the ethical fitness issues the 
Judiciary Committee raised, the two largest debates focused on client 
conflicts of interest, and the one that consumed the most floor time 
was the matter of United Shoe Machinery Company -- Brandeis’s 
former client.42   
The United Shoe Machinery Company was formed shortly 
before the turn of the century by a consolidation of several smaller 
companies.43  One of the groups that became a large shareholder in 
United was Brandeis’s client.44  Brandeis subsequently became a 
director of United and also served United as counsel.45  Prior to the 
adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which Congress passed in 
1890 “to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies,”46 United and its predecessors had been leasing their 
patented shoe machinery for use by shoe manufacturers.47  The lease 
agreements contained “tying” clauses, which required a lessee to use 
the patented machinery in conjunction only with other patented 
machinery.48  This gave the lessor a considerable monopolistic 
advantage.49   
 
40 John Braeman, The People’s Lawyer Revisited: Louis D. Brandeis Versus The United 
Shoe Machinery Company, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 284, 284-86 (2008-10); Helm, supra note 
1, at 2. 
41 Hazard, supra note 37, at 377. 
42 See Urofsky, supra note 2, at 310, 451 (noting that Brandeis’s allies “understood from 
the beginning” that the United matter would be the most damaging of all the ethical charges 
leveled against Brandeis in his confirmation hearings); TODD, supra note 2, at 151 (noting 
that Brandeis’s camp recognized the United matter “as the stickiest part of the combined 
campaign to defeat the nomination”). 
43 John Shepard Wiley, Jr., et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 697 
(1990). 
44 UROFSKY, supra note 2, at 310. 
45 Braeman, supra note 40, at 287.  
46 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012)). 
47 Frank, supra note 2, at 703.  
48 Braeman, supra note 40, at 289. 
49 Frank, supra note 2, at 703. 
8
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At first blush, United’s practice of precluding its own 
customers (shoe manufacturers) from using machinery manufactured 
by competitors, or put another way, United’s practice of forcing shoe 
manufacturers to use only United products if they used any, seems 
plainly anticompetitive.  However, it is important to consider the 
prevailing law at the time.  In 1895, the Supreme Court refused to 
apply the Sherman Act to the American Sugar Refining Company, 
which controlled a large majority of the manufactories of refined 
sugar in the United States and had a “practical monopoly of the 
business,” on the ground that Congress had the ability to regulate 
commerce but not manufacturing.50  The conservative Court insisted 
that Congress’s power to regulate commerce did not extend to the 
regulation of manufacturing in numerous cases in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s.51  It would be years before the Court shifted and, in the 
dawning of the New Deal Era, recognized that the effects of many 
kinds of intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such as to 
make them a proper subject of federal regulation.52   
Against that backdrop, United operated its lease system 
relatively safely under a narrow reading of the antitrust laws at the 
time Brandeis served as its counsel.53  However, the issue was not 
without debate in the legislatures.  In 1906, a bill was introduced in 
the Massachusetts Legislature to do what the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act was not accomplishing and restrict tying clauses.54  At 
United’s request, Brandeis reluctantly agreed to appear before the 
legislature and seek the defeat of the bill that would have outlawed 
the tying clauses in United’s contracts with shoe manufacturers.55   
Of notable interest was the fact that Brandeis was also counsel 
to a number of shoe manufacturers at the time.56  The conflict had 
been waived, however, as the shoe manufacturers had consented to 
the dual representation as part of their agreement with United that 
they would not support the legislation in exchange for receiving a 
favorable rate on United’s products should the contracts remain 
 
50 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238 (1899); United States v. 
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895). 
51 Addyston, 175 U.S. at 227; E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12-14. 
52 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1942). 
53 Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
54 Braeman, supra note 40, at 294. 
55 Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
56 Frank, supra note 2, at 705. 
9
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enforceable.57  Setting aside the reasonableness of that waiver, 
Brandeis’s decision to appear before the state legislature in defense of 
practices that placed significant restraints on both the manufacturers 
and competing shoe machineries’ right to do business was both 
legally and ethically debatable.58 
This was not the issue that got Brandeis into trouble at his 
confirmation hearings, though.  After Brandeis appeared for United, 
and helped stop the state legislation, he continued to monitor the law 
and became doubtful about the legality of United’s tying 
arrangements.59  He called his opinion to the attention of United’s 
counsel and later that same year tendered his resignation, first as a 
director and then as counsel for United.60  United and its successor 
corporation continued to employ various tying arrangements in its 
business.61  These eventually formed part of the landmark antitrust 
decision, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.62  
Meanwhile, shortly after Brandeis had ceased working for 
United, in 1907 the Massachusetts Legislature succeeded in passing a 
new bill against such leases and tying clauses.63  Brandeis had no role 
in that legislation and for some years thereafter he refused, on ethical 
grounds, requests by his remaining shoe manufacturer clients to assist 
them in opposing United’s increasingly sophisticated leasing 
practices.64  In 1910, however, after the Supreme Court had begun to 
embrace a broader reading of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Brandeis 
gave an opinion to another shoe machinery manufacturer that tying 
clauses were illegal.65   
The following year, Brandeis undertook the representation of 
the Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance, a consortium of shoe 
 
57 Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
58 Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
59 Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
60 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 219-20 (The Viking Press 
eds., 1946). 
61 Id. at 220. 
62 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
63 MASON, supra note 60, at 220. 
64 MASON, supra note 60, at 221. 
65 Brandeis’s opinion was based on the 1909 Supreme Court holding that a combination of 
wallpaper companies had violated the Sherman Act by forcing exclusive patronage to the 
conglomerate and by raising wholesaler and consumer prices, which was detrimental to the 
public interest.  See Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 
(1909). 
10
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manufacturers opposed to the giant United’s market strategies.66  The 
federal government then commenced an antitrust prosecution of 
United, in which Brandeis had no direct role.67  However, during that 
1911-1913 time frame, Brandeis testified before several 
congressional committees and federal agencies in support of 
legislation that became the Clayton Act,68 at the request of his client 
Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance.69  In his appearances, Brandeis cited 
United’s continued oppressive behavior as evidence of the need for 
changes in the antitrust laws.70  This sequence of events is what 
inspired the harshest attacks on Brandeis’s character by Republican 
senators during his nomination debacle. 
The Senate committee viewed the issue as one bedeviled by 
conflicts.71  The gravamen of the charge was that Brandeis acted 
against his former client United, having previously acted for that 
client in a related matter.72  Brandeis defended his position on an 
ideological level, addressing the inherent difficulties of the 
“independent lawyer” struggling to break free of a former client’s 
coercion.73  The objectors at Brandeis’s nomination hearings 
constructed some tendentious arguments to sustain their objections to 
his appointment.74   
The vast shift in the law between the time when Brandeis 
represented United in 1906 and when he opposed United in 1911-
1913 arguably precluded any direct conflict with a former client.75  
However, was the matter still substantially related, at least in spirit, 
so as to mar Brandeis’s credibility in acting out against United?  If 
Brandeis were to be reprimanded for his behavior, what message 
were the senators sending him, as a lawyer?  Must all lawyers refuse 
to embroil themselves in any representation that could even 
potentially conflict with an earlier representation, in the broadest 
 
66 MASON, supra note 60, at 223. 
67 MASON, supra note 60, at 223. 
68 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1914). 
69 MASON, supra note 60, at 224. 
70 A colorful historical anecdote illustrates the glacial rate of acceptance of such change 
by corporate America.  In 1912, Andrew Carnegie made the following breezy statement to a 
congressional committee that was investigating U.S. Steel: “Nobody ever mentioned the 
Sherman Act to me, that I can remember.”  See BEATTY, supra note 39, at 220. 
71 MASON, supra note 60, at 224-25. 
72 MASON, supra note 60, at 224.  
73 MASON, supra note 60, at 229. 
74 See TODD, supra note 2, at 110-12. 
75 See Frank, supra note 2 at 704. 
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terms possible and irrespective of an about-face change in the law?  
That hardly seems reasonable.   
Indeed, several witnesses supporting Brandeis’s nomination 
pointed this out, arguing that lawyers’ minds must be available to 
craft all of the best arguments for their clients irrespective of 
positions they may have taken for former clients.76  Many witnesses 
argued that Brandeis’s adaptability of mind made him a superior 
attorney and would make him an even better justice when he would 
be called on to apply the law to the ever-changing realities of modern 
industrial democracy which made him a superior attorney and would 
make him an even better justice.77 
Modern ethics rules can inform the aforementioned question, 
although they may fall short of providing the “right” answer.  A 
lawyer must not act against a former client where the lawyer has 
relevant confidential information about that client from an earlier 
retainer, which may be used against the client.78  Regardless of 
whether that information is used or not, the appearance of 
impropriety is sufficient to bar the future representation, unless the 
former client consents.79  Even if the lawyer did not in fact obtain any 
relevant or confidential information, the fiduciary duty of loyalty the 
lawyer owes to the former client extends the lawyer’s prohibition on 
acting against the former client, in the same or a substantially related 
matter representing interests adverse to the former client, again, 
absent consent or a waiver of an objection in writing.80 
That said, a lawyer cannot realistically be forever bound by 
the interests of a former client for all public and private matters of 
interest to the lawyer.  Brandeis argued, somewhat cagily, that he 
supported the Clayton Act on a personal level and that he represented 
 
76 See MASON, supra note 60, at 475, 482.  
77 See generally TODD, supra note 2.  For a specific example, one witness testified: “If 
there is one characteristic of Mr. Brandeis’[s] thinking, it is his capacity to see both sides; it 
is his capacity not only for judicial statement, but for judicial thought.”  TODD, supra note 2, 
at 153 (quoting testimony from Henry Moskowitz, Clerk of the Board of Arbitration 
covering the New York garment industry, which had benefited from Brandeis’s arbitration 
system). 
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
79 Id.  But see Kathleen Maher, Keeping Up Appearances, 16 PROF. LAW. 1, 1, 12 (2005) 
(pointing out that the American Bar Association Ethics 2000 Commission in 2002 removed 
reference to the “appearance of impropriety” standard because it was “no longer helpful to 
the analysis of questions arising under this Rule”). 
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmts. 1, 3-5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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himself in acting to advance the public interests.81  In support of this 
contention was the fact that he took no fee from (actually, he donated 
his fee back to) the Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance.82  He garnered 
some support from Senators in propounding the notion that a 
lawyer’s opinion on matters of public interest should not be 
circumscribed by client preferences.   
Indeed, it is often acknowledged that it is a mistake to judge a 
lawyer by the clients he or she represents.  A lawyer often find 
himself accepting legal work on behalf of a client in whose activities 
the lawyer does not personally believe.  Many criminal defense 
attorneys would be out of work if they did not have the freedom to 
separate their personal convictions from their professional 
representations.  In concurrence with one author who eloquently 
defended Brandeis, it would indeed be a tough law practice if the 
lawyer were required to underwrite the character of each of his 
clients.83  
A temporary incursion on a lawyer’s time and life by a 
pressing client matter is an unenviable but wholly expected and 
acceptable part of legal practice.  A permanent incursion, however, is 
not.  Legal ethics do not require a practicing attorney to become an 
automaton merely because, at one time, she subordinated her own 
interests or defined her public persona principally by her client’s 
goals.  ABA Model Rule 1.9 recognizes that the “substantial 
relationship” test does not persist ad infinitum.84  Confidential 
information that was or could have been gained in the course of a 
former client relationship can be rendered innocuous and obsolete by 
the passage of time or if the information has been disclosed to the 
public.85   
The transition of private to public knowledge is, in fact, a 
fundamental part of legal ethics that allows lawyers to maintain 
confidences and abide by the other fiduciary duties to their past and 
current clients, whilst also maintaining a functioning life in public 
society.86  A lawyer has the right to engage in public debate, to take 
 
81 See Frank, supra note 2, at 704-05. 
82 See Frank, supra note 2, at 704. 
83 Frank, supra note 2, at 686. 
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
85 Id. 
86 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also 
Pamela A. Bresnahan & Timothy H. Goodman, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Expert 
Testimony Regarding Attorney Ethics Rules, PROF. LAW., SYMP. 53, 54 (2003).  
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seriously his civic duties, and to get involved in political and social 
justice causes, as do all citizens.87  However, lawyers just have to 
remember to parse out “public” questions from “private” questions 
insofar as they concern client confidences.  Particularly in the case of 
former client conflicts, confidences can be construed ambiguously.  
How much information, knowledge and wisdom a lawyer gains from 
a prior representation that can ethically be construed as a client 
confidence is a vexatious question.   
IV.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
What is the provenance of a lawyer’s sapience?  The issue is 
existential in nature.  Brandeis recognized this, and refused to unduly 
fetter his public opinions on behalf of his private clients.88  Legal 
ethics should find a way to embrace, rather than shun, this ethos. 
Brandeis’s response to the Senators’ upbraiding is emblematic 
of his character, for two main reasons.89  First, Brandeis brought a 
moral dimension to his legal practice:  he regularly engaged in 
informal pro bono practice, refusing compensation for legal work that 
he believed was in the public interest, he reputedly outright refused to 
take on paying cases in whose justness he did not believe, and he 
sternly counseled clients against taking positions in their legal 
disputes that adopted unfavorable social policy.90  Second, Brandeis 
brought an autonomous lawyering ethic to his practice that was 
antithetical to the New England clubbiness attitude of legal practice.91   
Brandeis rejected any close alliances with any group, political 
party, cause, or client.92 His independent approach to legal practice 
epitomizes his aversion to acting as a mere representative for an 
anterior interest and to retain self-direction in his legal counseling.93  
 
87 See John T. Baker, Citizen Lawyers—the Past, Present, and Future of the Legal 
Profession, COLO. LAW. 99, 99 (2009) (defining “citizen lawyer” and stating that “civic 
responsibility and civic involvement traditionally were the hallmarks of practicing law”). 
88 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1470-71, 1474, 1476, 1517-18. 
89 See MASON, supra note 60, at 478-79, 483. 
90 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1477. 
91 See, e.g., TODD, supra note 2, at 118 (quoting testimony by Boston lawyer Sherman 
Whipple: “. . . I think if Mr. Brandeis had been a different sort of man, not so aloof, not so 
isolated, with more of the camaraderie of the bar, gave his confidence to more men, and took 
their confidence . . . and talked it over with them, you would not have heard the things you 
have heard in regard to him.”). 
92 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1451-56. 
93 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1451. 
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Indeed, many of Brandeis’s legal representations involved advocacy 
in the legislature on a variety of social policy issues.94  As a legal 
advocate, Brandeis mobilized a stridently nonpartisan voice for the 
“public interest” that he strongly believed was needed to compete 
with hard-charging interest groups and political power at the dawning 
of an age of increased legislation and regulation.95  Brandeis prided 
himself on being a detached, autonomous counselor, free of client 
dictation, and even depicted himself in his Senate hearings as having 
been “counsel for the situation,” a blunder which served him none too 
well in extricating himself from the client conflict at hand.96   
Nonetheless, Brandeis’s commitment to seek moral justice 
outside the conventional confines of the strict adversarial system of 
law now proscribed by a code of legal ethics is hardly reprobate.  
Brandeis was an advocate of several public causes and was insightful 
enough to recognize the benefits of legislative democracy over 
litigative democracy.97  That is, Brandeis may have had the power as 
an active litigant to make law, or rather, to get law made for his 
clients and for himself.  But he respectfully chose to support the 
legislative process, imperfect as it may be, to express his political 
views and to incorporate deliberation and compromise into the law-
making process.98  We can hardly fault him for embracing the 
democratic political system in this manner.  Brandeis did not try to 
legislate through lawsuits.  It is almost ironic that his policy-making 
endeavors ended up almost sidelining his chances for a career in the 
judicial branch of government. 
Certainly, we cannot judge Louis Brandeis the attorney for 
failing to adhere to contemporaneous standards of behavior in the 
then absence of a professional code of conduct, nor can we deem 
immoral his methods without apt respect for the then zeitgeist – the 
spirit of the times – and the manner in which other lawyers 
comported themselves at that time.  Giving fair value to the 
objections made by the Senate committee members in 1916, 
however, is Brandeis’s alleged shirking of certain of his ethical duties 
to hereinafter be disparaged and dismissed as dated behavior that 
 
94 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1487. 
95 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1487 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY, 380 (Princeton Univ. Press eds. 1988)). 
96 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1449-51. 
97 See LUBAN, supra note 95, at 380. 
98 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1488-89. 
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would simply not be a best practice for a lawyer in being accountable 
to his former and successive clients?  The applicable legal ethics rule, 
indeed even now, is not a paragon of clarity on the issue.  To what 
extent must a lawyer subordinate his or her own views on policy to 
persuasive advocacy on behalf of not even a current but a former 
client’s interest?  Must every lawyer be so scrupulously cautious at 
the outset when engaging a new client to have prospectively 
considered and rejected the possibility that such representation might 
lead the lawyer to make arguments that could compromise his or her 
credibility on all other public issues of personal interest? 
If so, what does that say about how we want lawyers to 
behave today--- to stop thinking independently once we retain our 
first client, to give up all of our outside interests, and to slavishly 
serve them forevermore?  Indeed, the all-encompassing culture of 
BigLaw suggests as much.99  But on an ideological level, do the ABA 
Model Rules serve to promote and foster milquetoast lawyers acting 
as mouthpieces for unchallenged client preferences?  Even when 
those clients are former clients?  If so, we need to seriously think 
about reevaluating the desirable balance of interests in the lawyer-
client relationship.  The legal ethics rules simply do not provide 
sufficient distinction between a lawyer’s public and private life to 
allow a practicing attorney to maintain both public autonomy and 
lawyerly zeal in the context of the lawyer-client relationship.  
Particularly in this day and age of strong and powerful corporate 
clients, where zealous representation is the industry standard, young 
attorneys entering private practice nowadays should think carefully 
about advertising themselves as single-minded gladiators, pursuing a 
single client’s interest without repose.  Practicing attorneys should 
maintain the values of freedom in choice and action, for their purpose 
is not only to maintain peace and order but also to bring the public 
administration of justice into touch with changing moral and political 
conditions so as to promote progress in society.  It would have been 
what Brandeis wanted.100 
 
 
99 See generally Anonymous, What’s It Like to Work at An Ultra Elite Law Firm, FORBES 
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2012/11/02/whats-it-like-to-work-at-an-
ultra-elite-law-firm/#61db7586ee1f. 
100 See Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
299, 313-14 (1985). 
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